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Notre Dame U n i v e r s i t y 
Most contemporary work in the realm o f the socio logy o f 
knowledge, i t i s here contended, has focused p r i m a r i l y on 
o b j e c t i f i e d forms and on the analysis o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
In so doing they have evaded the real dynamics o f knowledge and 
the l inks thereof between o b j e c t i f i e d knowledge and e p i s t e -
mology. Recent work, such as that by Berger and Luckmann, 
presents a more comprehensive approach. Never the less , an 
examination o f Hegel 's e a r l y theolog ica l w r i t i n g s reveals in 
more deta i l the complexity o f the dynamic process o f knowledge, 
i t s o b j e c t i f i cat ion and transformation. This essay takes f o r 
consideration the analys is o f some of these dimensions present 
in Hegel . I t focuses i n p a r t i c u l a r on : the 'break' and 
r e - u n i f i c a t i o n ; the re la t ionsh ip between immediacy and mediat ion, 
and the general s t ruc tu re o f the context o f knowledge and 
knowing. 
With regard to the usual conceptions in the soc io logy o f knowledge th i s 
paper might appear unusual. The realm o f the soc io logy o f knowledge i s genera l l y 
i d e n t i f i e d in contemporary American socio logy as having developed from 
Wissensoziologie. This c u l t u r a l t ranspos i t ion has i n t e r e s t i n g impl icat ions even 
at the l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l . The Engl ish t rans la t ion f o r instance reduces to a 
s ing le word both the verbal and substantive forms o f Wissensoziologie so that 
these dimensions become obscured. This ambiguity does not occur i n other 
l i n g u i s t i c systems, fo r instance : 
as a verb:tftfcJlf <*l'' , noscere, kennen, connaitre ( t o know) 
as a substantive:6V ^ £ V H L , s c i r e , w issen , s a v i o r (knowledge) 
Thus, in a s t r i c t sense, Wissensoziologie re fers to a soc io logy of substant ivated 
knowledge, which evades the processual formulation where s u b j e c t - o b j e c t and the 
category o f mediation between them becomes c r u c i a l . 
The pos i t ing o f such a question immediately reveals two d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s , 
even in the most systemat ica l l y developed approaches to a socio logy o f knowledge, 
those o f Karl Mannheim and Max Scheler . On the one hand there i s the dichotomiza-
t ion o f the enterpr ise in to two approaches, the " s t r u c t u r a l l y " or iented socio logy 
of knowledge and the "soc io logy o f the mind." Secondly , there i s the un i ta ry 
approach that focuses upon theore t i ca l concerns a t the leve l o f the mind. Thus, 
in Mannheim's o r i e n t a t i o n the u n i t y o f the processes o f knowing and o f knowledge 
are formally s p l i t i n t o two realms. Regarding Max Sche le r ' s o r i e n t a t i o n , he 
" i d e n t i f i e s to know and the knowledge of the essent ia l s t r u c t u r e o f everything that 
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i s " and adds two other realms, induct ive knowledge o f science and metaphysical 
knowledge, t h a t , i n a s t r i c t sense, escapes the realm of the sociology o f 
knowledge (Max Scheler , 1926;1928). 
The problem o f i d e n t i f y i n g the cruc ia l issue in the sociology o f knowledge 
becomes f i r s t an attempt to i s o l a t e a formulation in which taxonomic o b j e c t i f i ca -
t ions or r e d u c t i o n i s t i c perspectives are not requ i red . We assume that t h i s i s 
the case with Hegel . Consequently, we choose to examine Hegel's e a r l y works as 
the i n i t i a l s t e p - i n ident i f y ing , the most c ruc ia l categories in a socio logy o f 
knowledge as 6VU)\fo{ L and £ l blV^L. 
The Ear ly Development 
The analysis o f the contr ibut ions of the young Hegel , beginning w i th 
Di l they (Jugendgeschichte Hegels, 1921), has re -o r ien ted the study o f the process 
o f development o f Hegelian thought. When the concerns o f a r e l i g i o u s and 
e t h i c o - p o l i t i c a l nature ( t h a t insp i red the w r i t i n g s o f the young Hegel) are 
i d e n t i f i e d , the genesis o f Hegelian d i a l e c t i c s can no longer be understood 
exc lus i ve l y through i t s confrontat ion with the Kantian d i a l e c t i c s and the 
doctr inal formulations o f F ichte and Sche l l ing . I t must rather be fol lowed 
through i t s gradual development as an instrument to solve the r e l i g i o u s and 
e t h i c o - p o l i t i c a l problems that emerged in a per iod preceding the "specu lat ive" 
meeting o f the young Hegel wi th the philosophy o f F ichte and S c h e l l i n g , and also 
with the "c r i t ique o f pure reason" o f Kant and the on-going debate about such a 
cont r ibu t ion . 
I t should be noted that at the moment that Hegel addressed the Kantian 
theoret ical tes t and took a pos i t ion regarding the doct r ina l formulations o f 
Fichte and Schel l ing (as wel l as that o f J a c o b i ) , the d i a l e c t i c was already 
a defined s t r u c t u r e . In other words, the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c can no longer be 
interpreted as a product o f the "d ia lec t i ca l method" as presented by Kant and 
modified by Fichte and Sche l l ing but must be considered i n r e l a t i o n to the 
central problems o f the young Hegel's thought. 
In f a c t , i t i s in h is works from the Frankfurt per iod (from 1797 to 1800) 
that we f i r s t detect the organic determination o f the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c s t r u c t u r e , 
although the word " d i a l e c t i c " i s absent (see in p a r t i c u l a r H i r i n g , 1929-38). 
The wr i t ings o f th i s per iod systematical ly merge the motives that had been 
delineated in the years a t Tubingen and Berne; these are pr imar i l y V o l k s r e l i g i o n 
und Christentum (1793-4) , Das Leben Jesu (1795), and the f i r s t w r i t i n g o f 
P o s i t i v i t a t der c h r i s t l i c h e n Rel ig ion (1795-6). The fo l lowing motives d i rected 
Hegel to the question o f "break" and " r e u n i f i c a t i o n " : the c r i t i q u e o f C h r i s t i a n -
ism in the name o f an ideal Vo lks re l ig ion that supports the organic in tegrat ion o f 
the indiv idual in the soc ia l body; the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f th i s ideal in ancient 
r e l i g i o n as a coherent expression o f the s t ruc ture o f the Greco-Roman state and 
the "harmonic" existence o f man in c lass ica l a n t i q u i t y ; the ant i thes is o f the 
"happiness" in ancient r e l i g i o n as found in the "unhappiness" o f Hebraic r e l i g i o n 
through an analysis o f the meaning o f the predicat ion o f Jesus ; the dissemination 
o f Jesus' teachings through the "pos i t i v i sm" of Chr i s t ian ism; and readings o f 
German and French thought. I t i s in the formulation o f the problem o f "break" 
(Trennung) and " r e u n i f i c a t i o n " (Vereinigung) that the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c 
consol idates. 
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Although an exhaustive analys is of the development o f Hegelian thought i s 
not appropriate here, some at tent ion may be given to the way that Hegel reached 
the problem of "break" and " r e u n i f i c a t i o n . " 
The young Hegel's c r i t i q u e of r e l i g i o n is not d i rected to a return to a 
r e l i g i o n of the Enlightenment, nor to a confrontat ion wi th the Enlightenment 
and i t s program o f i n t e l l e c t u a l c i v i l i z a t i o n (Hege l , 1793-1794; D i l t h e y , 1907), 
nor to the appeal of Kant's ideal o f r e l i g i o n "at the l i m i t o f pure reason , " 
that i s , r e l i g i o n only as e t h i c s . The source o f such a c r i t i q u e i s V o l k s r e l i g i o n 
as an integra l element o f community, cont r ibut ing to the formation o f the " s p i r i t 
o f the people," as an organic t o t a l i t y in which the various manifestations o f 
social l i f e merge. 
Vo lks re l ig ion must represent the concrete h i s t o r i c mediation o f the s t rategy 
of natural r e l i g i o n , based upon rat iona l p r i n c i p l e s , and p o s i t i v e r e l i g i o n 
organized through s ta tu tory norms and supported by f a i t h and t r a d i t i o n . On the 
basis o f such a framework, considered as a c r i t i c a l d e v i c e , the young Hegel enters 
the polemic d i r e c t l y in confrontat ion to Chris t i anism. In contrapos i t ion to the 
Enlightenment, he sees C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n not as a V o l k s r e l i g i o n but ra ther as 
a "pr ivate r e l i g i o n . " Moreover, he notes that such r e l i g i o n was continuously 
changing on the basis o f i n t e r a c t i o n with the h i s t o r i c a l environment i n which 
i t emerged and had thus degenerated in to a form o f p o s i t i v e r e l i g i o n . O r i g i n a l l y , 
the content o f Jesus ' predicat ions was o f a moral nature , an appeal to v i r t u e . 
But then the f igure o f Jesus was in terpreted as that o f a "super-human ideal o f 
v i r t u e " (Nohl , 1907:57), as a person i f ied ideal o f "moral pe r fec t ion" ( N o h l , 
1907:67). On such a b a s i s , C h r i s t i a n i t y constructed i t s dogmatic e d i f i c e so as 
to reconci le i d e o l o g i c a l l y God and the world given to Jesus . Thus, C h r i s t i a n i t y 
developed a p o s i t i v e r e l i g i o n , a r e l i g i o n based on a u t h o r i t y . 
From the o r i g i n a l framework o f the young Hegel 's thought i s der ived a complex 
o f problems, taken into considerat ion f i r s t during h is residence at Berne and 
then at Frankfurt in Per Ge is t des Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798-9). 
B r i e f l y , th is complex inc ludes : a) determination o f the context o f Jesus ' 
p red icat ions ; b) explanations o f the transformation o f Chr ist ianism i n t o a p o s i t i v e 
r e l i g i o n by r e f e r r i n g to the h i s t o r i c a l condit ions o f the environment in which i t 
emerged and the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n o f the Roman empire; and c) determina-
t ion o f the dif ferences between ancient c l a s s i c a l r e l i g i o n and Chr is t ian ism based 
on t h e i r various soc ia l func t ions . 
The basis o f Hegel 's answer to these problems in Das Leben Jesu i s c l e a r l y 
a Kantian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the evangel ical message. Jesus ' p red icat ion i s purely 
moral; i t i s an appeal to s p i r i t u a l essences in opposi t ion to the l e t t e r o f the 
law, and thus not y e t a teaching o f s ta tu to ry norms but ra ther teachings at 
v i r t u e . How a r e l i g i o n o f a u t h o r i t y , organized according to dogma and incorporated 
in to i n s t i t u t i o n s , could emerge from such a r e l i g i o n o f freedom is analyzed and 
explained in the f i r s t volume o f h is P o s i t i v i t a t des c h r i s t l i c h e n R e l i g i o n . His 
explanation i s based upon an examination o f the r e l i g i o u s soc ia l context o f the 
Hebrews. According to Hege l , the r e l i g i o n o f the Hebrews i s one that does not 
admit a dimension o f freedom (the covenant and the law correspond to the 
serv i tude o f man). Furthermore, God i s r a d i c a l l y d i s t a n t from human l i f e . These 
charac te r i s t i cs o f the Hebrew r e l i g i o n , which Jesus opposed, nevertheless 
determined the nature o f h is own teachings, since they emerged from the Judaic 
context . They did so to such an extent that the moral teachings that were 
o r i g i n a l l y central as precepts (not as Laws) " l o s t the in te rna l c r i t e r i a o f 
necess i ty" (Noh l , 1907:165), and these precepts were transformed in to p o s i t i v e 
46 Kansas Journal of Sociology 
commands. Moreover, with the encounter of these developments with the myth o f the 
Messiah that pervaded Hebrew c u l t u r e , the f igure o f Jesus i s transformed in to that 
o f a supra-human being, and "the doctr ine of Jesus becomes the p o s i t i v e f a i t h 
of a sect" (Nohl , 1907:166). The teachings o f Jesus are thus i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d 
with a basis in the organizat ion of the Church, which through h i s t o r y elaborates 
i t s dogmas and creates a s t ructure o f the state t y p e , and y e t in opposit ion to 
the State (Nohl , 1907:173-175, 183-205). 
In cont ras t , the c lass i c ancient r e l i g i o n as a Vo lks re l ig ion was o rgan ica l l y 
integrated with the l i f e of the people, responding to the da i l y needs o f social 
ex istence. Christ ianism was a pos i t i ve r e l i g i o n that soon gave b i r t h to an 
ecc les ias t i ca l organizat ion in competit ion, and often in c o n f l i c t , with the 
organization o f the State and i t s requirements on the d a i l y l i f e o f the people. 
The re lat ionships o f Chr ist ianism with the S t a t e , as opposed to ancient c lass i ca l 
r e l i g i o n , r e f l e c t s the metaphysical opposit ion o f God's being and human l i f e . 
In Hegel 's wr i t ings between the years a t Tubingen and Berne, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
in the essay Die P o s i t i v i t à ^ der c h r i s t l i c h e n R e l i g i o n , his i n t e r e s t i n r e l i g i o n 
and in e t h i c o - p o l i t i c a l questions was actual ized in h i s t o r i c a l research. The 
c r i t i q u e o f Christ ianism i s f u r t h e r developed through the del ineat ion o f a 
hi s tor iographic framework that must support the s t ructure o f the h i s t o r y of 
Christ ianism and the s t ructure of pos i t i ve r e l i g i o n . The development o f 
" p o s i t i v i t y , " a problem to be solved through h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , i s viewed as 
a problem of decadence, degeneration, f o r which the coa l i t i ons must be s p e c i f i e d . 
In the Systemfragment (1800), Hegel's thought i s even more complex; " p o s i t i v i t y " 
appears as the r e s u l t o f a "break" interpreted metaphysical ly . This break must 
r e s u l t from the h i s t o r i c a l process and i s to be in te rpre ted and then el iminated 
to re -es tab l i sh simultaneously the uni ty o f man and soc ia l r e a l i t y and 
n o n - p o s i t i v i t y o f r e l i g i o n . There are some s p e c i f i c elements that can enl ighten 
such t r a n s i t i o n o f Hegel's thought, and they r e s u l t from the change in German 
ideas since Kant and from the influence of the Sturm und Drang in the framework 
o f romantic cu l tu re . Sturm and Drang of fers a c r i t i q u e o f Kantian ethics and 
i s added to the inf luences that Hegel receives from the in te rp re ta t ion o f 
r e l i g i o u s l i f e of fered by S c h e l l i n g , the inf luence o f F i ch te ' s Wissenschaftslehre 
( that had published h is Vom Ich als Pr inz ip der Philosophie in 1795), and 
the exchanges with Ho lder l in (Hoffmeister , 1931). Moreover, whi le these 
i n t e l l e c t u a l elements underl ine the transformations o f Hegel's th ink ing , the 
changes in European p o l i t i c s , from the French revo lu t ion to the Napoleonic p e r i o d , 
which supported a gradual withdrawing o f republican i d e a l s , led to the develop-
ment o f quite contrast ing ideologica l formulat ions. 
Thus, these processes have a bearing on the re in te rp re ta t ions o f e a r l y 
r e l i g i o u s thought. The God of Abraham i s t o t a l l y extraneous to the l i f e o f his 
people and i s "the i n f i n i t e o b j e c t , the complex o f one t ru th and one r e l a t i o n , 
thus , the only properly subject ive i n f i n i t e " (Noh l , 1907: 250), in the face o f 
whom man does not re ta in any margin o f autonomy and becomes a simple "property 
o f God" (Nohl , 1907:251), t o t a l l y passive i n such conf rontat ion . Between God 
and human l i f e there i s then an i r reparable "break," the roots of "unhappiness" 
o f the Jewish people, which influences even the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y o f t h e i r 
s o c i e t y , so d i f f e r e n t from the c lass ica l w o r l d . The same break occurs in 
Christ ianism inasmuch as i t withdraws from the o r i g i n a l character o f Jesus ' p re -
dicat ions and changes them in to a pos i t i ve r e l i g i o n . The themes o f these analyses 
are s imi la r to those that Hegel prev ious ly considered in Berne, but the emphasis 
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i s qui te d i f f e r e n t . Now the teachings o f Jesus are no longer considered as purely 
moral but are rather character ized according to the Kantian framework as 
establ ish ing a " r e l i g i o n o f v i r t u e . " Moreover, there is an added emphasis on 
the love re la t ionsh ip between God and man. With the change in to p o s i t i v e 
r e l i g i o n , such a love r e l a t i o n s h i p i s replaced by the obedience o f man to 
cod i f ied precepts. Thus, Hegel 's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Jesus ' predicat ions changes, 
and, correspondingly , there i s a s h i f t to the va luat ion o f eth ics and o f the 
re la t ionsh ips between e th i cs and r e l i g i o n . In any e v e n t , the changes in 
h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are subordinated to the c r i t i c a l pos i t ion taken by 
Hegel to the Kantian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e l i g i o n . In f a c t , the "break" in the 
r e l i g i o u s realm that i s expressed both in Judaism and Chr ist ianism also const i tutes 
the basis o f ethics regarding the dominance o f the imperatives that i n t e r f e r e 
w i th the tendencies o f man. The antagonism between law and human i n c l i n a t i o n 
i s the s t ruc tura l element o f the e t h i c s : the "must be" i s presented to the 
sensible nature o f man as an extraneous force o f r e s t r i c t i v e character , and i t 
acts as a cohesive power, even when i t i s sub jec t i ve in o r i g i n . To th i s i t i s 
necessary to add that the "must be" is conceived as a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f non-
organi c a i l y l inked imperat ives , which often determines c o n f l i c t . Thus, the 
c o n f l i c t between law and human i n c l i n a t i o n is l inked to the in te rna l c o n f l i c t 
regarding the various spheres and types o f duty . Consequently, r e l i g i o u s l i f e i s 
not placed with in the domain o f e t h i c s , which would presuppose the e l iminat ion 
of the "break" and o f a passage to a d i f f e r e n t dimension in which the opposit ion 
between law and i n c l i n a t i o n o r the c o n f l i c t o f opposing duties would not occur . 
Such a dimension i s then represented as that o f l o v e ; as the center o f Jesus ' 
p red icat ions , i t i s d i r e c t l y l inked to God and unites God and man through the 
evangel ic message. 
As a r e s u l t , the problem of "break" reappears as that o f the processes 
w i th in the re lat ionsh ips o f e t h i c (o r p o s i t i v e r e l i g i o n ) and l o v e . In the 
dimension of love i s solved the o p p o s i t i o n , the c o n f l i c t between law and human 
i n c l i n a t i o n ; the c o n f l i c t s der ived from the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f incompatible dut ies 
i s reso lved , and thus the un i t y o f l i f e i s r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . Thus: 
. . . l o v e does not express any essent ia l duty inasmuch i t i s not 
an universal element i n opposi t ion to a s p e c i f i c determinat ion; 
and i t i s not a conceptual un i ty (eine E inhe i t des B e g r i f f s ) , 
but rather the s i n g u l a r u n i t y o f the s p i r i t ( E i n i q k e i t des 
G e i s t e s ) , d iv ine support ( G o t t i i c h k e i t ) ; to love God means to 
feel in the t o t a l i t y o f l i f e , without l i m i t , to the i n f i n i t e . . . 
(Nohl , 1907:296). 
In the determination o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p surfaces s p e c i f i c a l l y the f i r s t 
open expression o f the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c . In f a c t , the d i a l e c t i c process as a 
process o f so lut ion o f the opposi t ions through the r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f oppos i tes , 
which has i t s core in the e l iminat ion o f a "break" through the " s o l u t i o n " o f 
such opposit ion in a h igher u n i t y , recognized as the basis o f both , , appears 
a l ready defined i n the essays o f t h i s pe r iod . Moreover, the two fundamental 
moments o f the "break" (which lead to the oppos i t ion) are already also 
determined at the moment o f r e u n i f i c a t i o n . 
I t i s important to under l ine that the d e f i n i t i o n o f the •&M£0$M$$$-cess 
during the period at F rankfur t occurs in a d iscussion o f reii9i;ojus;^K§j^^^i;on?. 
and br ings with i t a ser ies o f impl icat ions that under l ine th&.$M£^m$!)-c« 
such e t h i c o - p o l i t i c a l character . Moreover, i t i s appl ied i n . i n a l y ^ ^ l f j p e c i f l c 
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re l i g ious quest ions, such as that of the question of the T r i n i t y and the mediating 
role of Chr is t (Nohl , 1907:309-10). 
Through such an analys is Hegel reaches the expression o f the central p r e -
suppositions of romantic c u l t u r e , that o f an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between f i n i t e and 
i n f i n i t e . Divine substance i s the s p e c i f i c s p i r i t u a l essence o f l i f e ; and 
l i f e i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y i n f i n i t e , thus the union o f i n f i n i t e and f i n i t e ; o r , in a 
more s p e c i f i c Hegelian formulat ion , the moment manifested by a ser ies of f i n i t e 
determinations which are continuously resolved in i t s i n f i n i t e process. Thus, 
from the theological problem of incarnation (Menschwerdung) o f God ( that rep re -
sented the salvat ion o f the world o f s in and the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with such world 
o f man with God because o f d iv ine i n i t i a t i v e ) , emerges the problem o f mediat ion, 
posited as the search o f a d i a l e c t i c a l mediation that can be reached through the 
e l iminat ion o f the "break" and the conquest o f un i t y beyond the plane o f the 
i so la ted existence o f opposite terms ( N i e l , 1945, chapter 1 ) . 
Moreover, the question also emerges in the most mature wr i t i ng o f the 
Frankfur t period (Systemfragment), where the "break" i s def ined as opposi t ion 
between the unity o f l i f e and the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i t s p a r t i c u l a r determinations, 
and the question o f r e u n i f i c a t i o n becomes the conquest o f a u n i t y - t o t a l i t y that 
includes as i t s own the necessary moments o f determination (Har ing , 1929-38:536; 
De N e g r i , 1943:66-71). The emergence o f opposit ion i s inherent to the continuous 
becoming o f l i f e in mul t ip le ind iv idua l forms, in a p l u r a l i t y o f "be ings , " since 
on the one hand the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the p a r t i c u l a r determinations is opposed to 
l i f e in i t s un i ty which in i t s e l f remains a b s t r a c t , and on the other hand one 
i n d i v i d u a l , i so lated from o t h e r s , i s placed in opposit ion to the o ther . 
The concept o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y implies the opposi t ion in the 
confrontation o f i n f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c i t y and i n conjunction with 
such m u l t i p l i c i t y . A man i s an ind iv idua l l i f e inasmuch he i s 
that in r e l a t i o n to a l l the other elements, and inasmuch the 
i n f i n i t y o f ind i v idua l l i f e ex i s t s outside him; and he i s only 
inasmuch the t o t a l i t y o f l i f e i s d i v ided—he i s a pa r t i n r e l a t i o n 
to which the remainder const i tutes the other p a r t , and only while 
i t i s not a part and nothing i s separated from him. Presupposing 
and establ ishing the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y o f l i f e , we can consider the 
l i v i n g beings as manifestations o f l i f e and as i t s rep resenta t ion - -
there is then the m u l t i p l i c i t y in i t s tempora l i t y , and uni ty i n 
i t s a - temporal i ty ; thus , l i f e , whi le grasped from the ous t ide , 
our l imited l i f e , i s shown as i n f i n i t e , or i n f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c i t y , 
o f i n f i n i t e oppos i t i on , of i n f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and i t i s as 
p l u r a l i t y an i n f i n i t e p l u r a l i t y o f organizat ion and i n d i v i d u a l s , 
and as uni ty a sole t o t a l i t y , organized, i n t e r n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , 
and u n i f i e d — t h a t i s , nature ( N o h l , 1907:346-7). 
Thus, the s p i r i t u a l essence o f l i f e expresses the coincidence o f i n f i n i t e 
and f i n i t e at the moment that the ind iv idua l determination o f l i f e i s solved in 
i t s u n i t y - t o t a l i t y , and becomes a necessary element. Such so lu t ion becomes 
p o s s i b l e , considered i n i t s l og ica l perspect i ve , i f we go beyond the l i m i t s o f 
r e f l e x i o n which i so la te the i n d i v i d u a l s . And, at t h i s p o i n t , in the develop-
ment o f Hegelian thought, emerges the problem o f determining an organ gnoseo-
l o g i c a l l y capable o f breaking out o f the i s o l a t i n g procedure o f r e f l e c t i o n , and 
grasping the process o f l i f e in i t s un i ty o f "synthesis and a n t i t h e s i s " (Noh l , 
1907:348). In the essay Per Geist des Christentums und sein Sch icksa l , such 
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funct ion was given through l o v e , r e l i g i o n then being considered as culmination o f 
l o v e ; s i m i l a r l y in the Systemfragment, r e l i g i o n is ind icated as the organ that 
makes possible "the r i s e from f i n i t e to i n f i n i t e " ( N o h l , 1907:350). I t i s a 
so lu t ion that Hegel w i l l soon abandon in the f i r s t w r i t i n g s o f the Jena p e r i o d , 
replacing r e l i g i o n by speculat ive reason. In the e a r l i e r V o l k s r e l i g i o n und 
Christentum he had aff irmed by analogy with l o v e , i n opposi t ion to i n t e l l e c t , 
which was the organ o f r e f l e c t i o n . I t i s also important to ind icate that in the 
Systemfragment there is a preoccupation with the d e f i n i t i o n o f the s t ructure o f 
the d i a l e c t i c a l process, which corresponds to an attempt to speci fy the l o g i c a l 
dimensions of the type o f considerat ion that intends to view l i f e as a d i a l e c t i c a l 
process. Thus, in such regard , the d i a l e c t i c i s conceived on the one hand as the 
metaphysical s t ructure o f l i f e (a s t ructure that has i t s fundamental moments in 
the "break" and in the " r e u n i f i c a t i o n " ) , and on the other hand as the l o g i c a l 
s t ructure o f the procedure through which l i f e can be grasped. To the form o f 
abstract u n i t y , o f m u l t i p l i c i t y , and o f u n i t y - t o t a l i t y corresponds the conceptual 
moments (defined according to a terminology discussed in the Fichtean Wissen-
s c h a f t s l e h r e ) , o f t h e s i s , a n t i t h e s i s , and synthes is . Thus, the d i a l e c t i c reveals 
i t s e l f in i t s two faces , metaphysical and l o g i c a l . 
The Relat ionship Between Immediacy and Mediation 
Developed as a means f o r the so lut ion o f problems o f a r e l i g i o u s nature , to 
which there is always an e t h i c o - p o l i t i c a l dimension ( i n r e l a t i o n to the 
theological theme o f i n c a r n a t i o n , t ranslated in to the research o f a mediation 
between God and the w o r l d ) , the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c i s already defined i n i t s 
basic elements at the end o f the years in F rankfu r t . Although that per iod might 
be interpreted as a period o f c r i s i s in the development o f Hegelian thought 
(Lukacs, 1948), such preoccupations continue during the Jena period i n the 
Phenomenology o f the Mind and other w r i t i n g s . When Hegel intervenes ( a t Jena) 
in the German phi losophical debate, taking a leading p o s i t i o n in contemporary 
thought in the polemics between F ichte and S c h e l l i n g , he has already a doc t r ina l 
framework well de l ineated. In the essay Di f ferenz des F ichte 'schen und 
Schel l ing'schen Systems der Phi losophie (1801), and in the w r i t i n g s publ ished i n 
the Kr i t i sches Journal der""Phi losopnie (1 0 2 ) , the d i a l e c t i c i s developed i n i t s 
l o g i c a l character to become the centra l nucleus o f a methodology f o r the ana lys is 
o f h i s problems. 
In the Systemfragment, Hegel had counterpoised the " i s o l a t i n g " r e f l e c t i o n 
that i s concerned with the s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the p a r t i c u l a r determination o f l i f e 
and separated i t from " r e l i g i o n " as the procedure f o r " r e u n i f i c a t i o n . " Now the 
ant i thes is is presented in a d i f f e r e n t form, as the oppos i t ion between the 
i n t e l l e c t and speculat ive reason; and simultaneously the problem of accomplishing 
the t r a n s i t i o n from one to the other appears. The i n t e l l e c t i s the gnoseologie 
organ that co l lec ts r e a l i t y i n i t s o p p o s i t i o n ; i t i s considered the m u l t i p l i c i t y 
o f ind iv idua l determinations as a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f independent terms and in 
counterposit ion to the abso lute . Such reformulation leads now to the ant i thes i s 
between f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e . Thus, "reason i s placed against absolute f i x a t i o n 
o f the dupl icat ion process operated i n the i n t e l l e c t " and r e - d i r e c t i n g the 
mult ip le determinations to t h e i r fundamental u n i t y , so as " reun i f y ing that which 
was separated" (Lasson, 1928:14). Such a s i t u a t i o n becomes possib le at the same 
time that reason acquires the consciousness o f the " r e l a t i o n s h i p with the absolute" 
that i s i n t r i n s i c to the manifestat ion o f l i f e (Lasson, 1928:17), and permits 
the l i b e r a t i o n o f such manifestations from t h e i r character o f l i m i t a t i o n . The 
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t r a n s i t i o n from i n t e l l e c t to reason resul ts from phi losophical r e f l e c t i o n that 
proceeds against the separation and opposition to reach speculat ive reason. 
Thus, the procedure o f phi losophical r e f l e c t i o n is modeled a f t e r the schema o f 
the d i a l e c t i c a l process in which i s recognized the s t ructure o f r e a l i t y : the 
movement from the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the indiv idual determinations to reach a 
u n i t y - t o t a l i t y and o f which they are a necessary moment, o rgan ica l l y inser ted 
in the t o t a l i t y of the process. Consequently, philosophy must assume a 
systematic form to be able to re la te indiv idual determinations in to an organic 
t o t a l i t y . 
Philosophy, while i t const i tutes a t o t a l i t y o f knowledge produced 
through r e f l e c t i o n , becomes a system, which i s an ensemble of 
concepts, ruled not by the i n t e l l e c t but by reason. One must 
show c l e a r l y the opposed, which gives the way to the l i m i t , 
the bas is , and the condit ions o f the opposed; con t ra r iw ise , 
reason reuni f ies these elements in c o n t r a d i c t i o n , grasps them, 
and solves them (Lasson, 1928:25-26). 
Thus philosophy appears not only as a system f o r reaching the u n i t y - t o t a l i t y 
o f the manifestations o f r e a l i t y , but i t i s rather such r e a l i t y in i t s conscious 
form ( e . g . , the ordered system o f c o l l e c t i v e representat ions ) . In f a c t , the 
absolute becoming phi losophical consciousness i s "an ob ject i ve t o t a l i t y , " 
"knowledge in i t s t o t a l i t y (e in Ganzes von Wissen), "an organizat ion o f knowledge" 
(Lasson, 1928:21). At the apex o f the d i a l e c t i c process, we glimpse already in 
the essay on the Di f ferenz the absolute knowledge that w i l l become the supreme 
f igure in the Phenomenology of the Mind, absolute knowledge as the coincidence 
of speculative reason and r e a l i t y , and in which are solved and ordered a l l the 
determinations, and in which a s p e c i f i c d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f the two loses meaning. 
The subst i tut ions o f r e l i g i o n by speculat ive reason (as a means o f apprehending 
the reun i f i ca t ion o f the opposed) i s precise in a way that w i l l remain unchanged 
in Hegel's l a t e r works and w i l l remain an ind ispensib le funct ion o f the d i a l e c t i c . 
I f philosophy must be organized into a conceptual t o t a l i t y and move in the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the ind iv idua l determinations o f r e a l i t y to solve them in such 
t o t a l i t y , i t i s c lear that i t cannot assume the form o f a set o f i n t e r r e l a t e d 
proposit ions that can be deduced from a fundamental p r o p o s i t i o n , fo l lowing F i ch te ' s 
account in the Wissenschaftslehre. In th is regard , Hegel 's d i a l e c t i c in the 
Dif ferenz is defined polemical ly in re la t ion to the Fichtean d i a l e c t i c . Not only 
because Hegel proceeds to define the st ructure o f the d i a l e c t i c a l process based 
on very d i f f e r e n t concerns when compared to the gnoseological preoccupations o f 
F i c h t e , but also because the system is r e - d i r e c t e d to subjects quite d i f f e r e n t 
from the o r ig ina l formulat ions. Such aspects appear even in the Di f ferenz where 
Hegel equates the equivalence o f the p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y and that o f o p p o s i t i o n ; 
not i den t i f y in i t s e l f but in r e l a t i o n to the opposi t ion can const i tute the basis 
o f phi l isophy ( e . g . , the r e l a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e ) . The d i r e c t impl icat ion regarding 
Fichte i s that the t r i adic p r i n c i p l e cannot be considered as the expression o f a 
deductive procedure (Lasson, 1928:38). The c r i t i c i s m regarding s u b j e c t i v i t y i s 
s i m i l a r l y raised to Kant in the essay Glauben und Wissen oder die Ref lex ions -
phi losophie der S u b j e k t i v i t a t (1802). 
Thus, "real i n f i n i t y " cannot be considered as a ser ies o f moments without 
conclusion; i t i s an inherent dimension to the ind iv idua l determinations o f 
r e a l i t y , in t h e i r so lut ion into an organic t o t a l i t y that comprehends them. As a 
r e s u l t , f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e cannot be viewed as extraneous terms but rather as 
co inc identa l . 
Knowledge in Hegel's Ear ly Works 51 
Such is above a l l the true nature o f the f i n i t e , that i t i s 
i n f i n i t e , and that i t i s solved in i t s being ( f i n i t u d e ) . The 
determinate element has n o t , as such, any other mode of being 
besides such absolute rest lessness o f not being that which i t i s : 
that i t i s not noth ing , inasmuch i t i s another and that the 
other i s the contrary o f i t , and never the less , i t i s that 
determinate element (Lasson, 1923:31). 
Thus, i n f i n i t y is the d i r e c t substance o f the f i n i t e , the cont rad ic tory 
s t ructure o f r e a l i t y , in v i r t u e o f which the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i t s ind i v idua l 
determinations are solved in a d i a l e c t i c process: i t i s the "negation o f the 
negation" that appears in the l a s t instance as an " a f f i r m a t i o n " (Lasson, 1923:31). 
In f a c t , any manifestation o f r e a l i t y , whi le l i m i t e d , has a "negative" character 
( i t implies or i s a negation o f i t s e l f in regard to the other mani festat ions , 
or in a re la t ionsh ip with the u n i t y ) . Consequently, the negation o f such mani-
f e s t a t i o n , which i s the e l iminat ion o f i s o l a t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n , i s i n i t s turn 
an a f f i r m a t i o n ; wi th i t the f i n i t e determination i s recognized as an element 
part o f the u n i t y - t o t a l i t y . I n f i n i t y i s thus the movement in the "so lu t ion 
o f ant i theses" (Lasson, 1923:33), inherent in the connections o f the f i n i t e 
determinations o f r e a l i t y . 
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g his conception o f d i a l e c t i c s from that o f F i c h t e , Hegel often 
r e c a l l s the pos i t ion o f S c h e l l i n g ; thus , he aff i rms ( D i f f e r e n z ) the fundamental 
a f f i n i t y o f his thought wi th that author . Moreover, the years a t Jena are some 
o f the c losest co l laborat ion between these authors on the basis o f a philosophy 
o f i d e n t i t y in which subject and object come to c o i n c i d e , and in which the 
absolute i s understood not any longer as pure s u b j e c t i v i t y but ra ther as "the 
equa l i t y o f i d e n t i t y and n o n - i d e n t i t y " (Lasson, 1928:77). From S c h e l l i n g , Hegel 
in fac t develops i n t e r e s t f o r the phi losophical considerat ion o f nature and the 
means to i t s development (Hof fmeis ter , 1932). Nature i s a realm in which s p i r i t 
subsists i n a la ten t form, without being y e t conscious o f i t s e l f ; and i t s 
phenomenon i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y resolved inasmuch as i t approximates the a c q u i s i t i o n 
o f s p i r i t u a l knowledge. To determine the rhythm o f such process , Hegel re fe rs 
to a previous schema o f d i a l e c t i c (from F r a n k f u r t , under the inf luence o f 
S c h e l l i n g ) : nature i s a ser ies o f " p o t e n t i a l i t i e s " that go beyond reason by 
v i r t u e of an in ternal " p o l a r i t y , " g i v i n g place to a continuous " increment." 
In te rpre t ing nature as the counterpoint o f mind, as "another world regarding the 
world o f the mind," the problem of the "deduction" o f nature appears f o r the 
f i r s t time (Lasson, 1923:184-6). Such formulation w i l l be retaken l a t e r in the 
Encyclopedia where Hegel o r i e n t s the analys is to the determination o f the conceptual 
s t ructure o f natural phenomena. Thus, the essence o f the natural process i s 
viewed as a ser ies o f conceptual elements that reproduce in a covered fashion the 
re la t ionsh ips o f l o g i c a l determinations. 
Nevertheless, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y in the conception o f absolute (and the 
procedures o f philosophy) that appears the d i f ference between Hegel and 
Sche l l ing . E a r l i e r , in the polemic with Fichte ( D i f f e r e n z ) , when Hegel re fe rs 
to the absolute, he means not the und i f fe rent ia ted un i t y that annuls the 
ind iv idua l determinations, that cancels l i m i t a t i o n s and oppos i t i ons ; but ra ther 
to the r e s u l t o f the process invo l v ing the s p i r i t i n the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f d e t e r -
minations resu l t ing in a u n i t y - t o t a l i t y . In such un i t y the determinations are 
maintained, not i n t h e i r i s o l a t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n s , but ra ther as necessary 
moments o f an organic t o t a l i t y . To th i s corresponds the d e f i n i t i o n o f speculat ive 
reason as the supreme organ o f knowing and the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the functions of a r t : 
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I t s element [ a r t ] i s i n t u i t i o n ; but that i s the immediacy without 
mediation. Thus, to the mind such element remains inadequate. . . 
I t i s no t , r e a l l y , the form of thought (Lasson, 1923:265). 
Philosophy i s placed above a r t , and includes the "form of mediation, the 
concept" (Lasson, 1923:267). Accord ing ly , i t makes possible to penetrate the 
connections o f the ind iv idua l determinations o f r e a l i t y and to l i n k them to 
a u n i t y - t o t a l i t y . In other words, philosophy (whi le speculat ive reason) is 
the s p e c i f i c organ o f mediat ion, expressing the mediation i n t r i n s i c to the 
st ructure of the mind. The mind i s thus the being "that i s mediated through 
i t s e l f , " and which e x i s t s only "solv ing that which i s immediately" proceeding 
beyond immediacy (Lasson, 1923:272). The reference to i t s e l f i s i n t r i n s i c to 
i t s s t r u c t u r e , to i t s own ex is tence . In f a c t , every determination o f the mind 
is an "immediate" element that requires a mediat ion; and such mediation i s 
nothing but the d i a l e c t i c procedure o f that s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y . 
The General Structure o f the Context o f Knowledge and Knowing 
In the preceeding a n a l y s i s , two elements were l i f t e d out o f Hegel's e a r l y 
w r i t i n g s : those o f the "break" and of "immediacy and mediat ion." Even i n such 
a l imi ted presentation there are h ints that the problem discussed by Hegel i s 
more complex. To present even a general descr ip t ion we would have to l i m i t i t 
here to the sketch o f i t s main o u t l i n e s . The general context could be described 
as possible l ines o f movement in the sub jec t -ob jec t r e l a t i o n with in space and 
time. We w i l l discuss th i s in what fo l lows . Nevertheless , to give a glimpse 
o f the added complexity o f the general contex t , i t might be enough to compare i t 
with another c l a s s i c p r o p o s i t i o n , that o f Democritus (Chisholm, 1966:91-102). 
Thus, "the ways in which the things that we perceive appear to us when we 
perceive them depends in par t upon our own psychological and phys io log ica l 
condit ion. . .Democri tus took i t to imply not only that we think we perce ive , but 
also that the external things are not at a l l what we tend to bel ieve they are" 
(Chisholm, 1966:91). As a r e s u l t , those appearances "change with the condit ion 
o f our body and the inf luences coming toward i t or r e s i s t i n g i t " (Nahm, 1934:209). 
The basis f o r the c r i t i c i s m o f th i s and s i m i l a r pos i t ions i s founded upon a 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between d ispos i t iona l and sensible proposit ions regarding a 
" th ing" ( fo l lowing A r i s t o t l e ) . But , when we consider the context in which the 
question appears in Hegel ( e . g . , p o s i t i v i t y o f Chr i s t ian ism) , these arguments 
do not apply ; p a r t i c u l a r l y in the r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t character o f the r e l a t i o n -
ships between sub jec t -ob jec t ( e . g . , man-normative r e l i g i o n ; e t h i c s - r i t u a l i s m ) . 
A general sketch o f the s i t u a t i o n in Hegel would include the fo l low ing : 
a) movement o f the subject toward o b j e c t , b) cogn i t i ve movement of sub jec t , 
c) movement o f s u b j e c t - o b j e c t w i th in time ( space ) - sync ron ic ; d) movement o f 
sub ject -ob ject through t ime-d iachronic . 
A fundamental dimension that sets the context o f knowledge (knowing) is that 
o f meanings ( f o r example, regarding the mirac les : " I t i s true that opponents o f 
C h r i s t i a n i t y have advanced the considerations against the reality and philosophers 
against the p o s s i b i l i t y , o f mi rac les ; but th i s does not diminish t h e i r e f f e c t , 
because what i s everywhere admitted, and what i s enough fo r the argument here , i s 
that these deeds o f Jesus were miracles in the eyes o f his pupi ls and f r i e n d s " 
(Nohl , 1907:78). 
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The predications o f Jesus were fundamentally e t h i c a l , and as such "could" be 
perceived as t r u t h f u l . Nevertheless , i n t h e i r context o f g ivenness, the process 
of "knowing" them could not be summed in to the dimension (a) above ( t h a t i s , 
a movement o f subject—man, Jews, Jesus ' fo l lowers and f r i e n d s — s i m p l y toward 
the o b j e c t - - - t h e e th i ca l enunc ia t ions ) . Social and c u l t u r a l accret ions to the 
context of meaning lead to perceptual apprehension ( e . g . , they were viewed from 
the perspective and the s o c i o - c u l t u r a l background o f Judaism; they were immediately 
l inked to the person o f Jesus , e t c . ) , so as that already in the dimension (b) 
above, the cognit ive movement o f the subject to o b j e c t , these accret ions appear. 
As a r e s u l t , the complexity o f d i a l e c t i c a l analys is at th i s level already e n t a i l s 
the concomitant analys is o f three nexus o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s : s u b j e c t - o b j e c t , t h e i r 
synchronic r e l a t i o n s , and t h e i r d iachronic r e l a t i o n s , in a process o f surpassing 
each o f the p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e manifestations and transcending them in to a new 
dynamic " t o t a l i t y . " 
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